La disciplina degli incentivi nella prestazione dei servizi di investimento all'interno della strategia per gli investimenti al dettaglio promossa dalla Commissione europea

Within the European Commission’s Retail Investment Strategy, it is discussed if the regime related to the inducements received by the distributor of financial instruments from the assets manager must be modified. This has raised a broad debate, understandable also in the light of the effects of this regulation on the business models of the financial intermediaries, which may vary according to the financial system of each Member State of the European Union. In this context, the intervention of the law seems appropriate, in consideration of the difficulties encountered by market dynamics in supervising and, if necessary, preventing any behavior in conflict of interest or positional annuities of intermediaries. Analyzing the answers to the public consultation promoted by the European Commission, as well as to the Call for Advice, the arguments in support of the ban on inducements do not appear particularly decisive: the total cost borne by the customer is not necessarily limited; the inability to receive the inducements does not eliminate potential conflicts of interest. Introducing a total ban on inducements would, on the other hand, lead to unintended consequences, such as the creation of an “advice gap” particularly problematic for retail investors, an increase in transaction costs in the relationship between intermediary and clients, as well as, finally, an incentive for intermediaries to adopts a “closed architecture” system, thus reducing competition between financial products. The further consideration of the implications of a general nature, with particular reference to the diffusion of exchange traded funds and the provision of the advice services, ultimately suggest an operational proposal: to allow the perception of an incentive only in the case of a “dynamic” valuation of investments, to be made periodically.