ISAF, Afghanistan and the Pakistan Dimension: Towards an Acceptable Transition

The article explores the domestic and regional implications of\r\nthe NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan after 2014. In domestic\r\npolitics, the withdrawal will intersect with political transition: the\r\npresidential elections. According to the author, the results of the\r\nelections will represent either the failure or success of the ambi\r\n-\r\ntious program of assistance and stabilization launched by the international community twelve\r\nyears ago. It also represents the need to avoid the disastrous results of the 2009 presidential\r\nelections, marked by massive fraud and manipulation. However, as the paper suggests, the\r\ncurrent political scenario in Kabul is not very promising: personal rivalries, tribal feuds,\r\nethno-tribal sectarianism, disinclining mode vis-à-vis international requests of transparency\r\nand clear voting mechanisms. In this sense, the future of Afghanistan as a united and stable\r\ncountry seems to be the less important goal for the Afghan political elites. In such a fragile\r\nsituation, the regional dimension of the conflict acquires even greater importance. This is\r\nbecause if Pakistan does not effectively deal with Taliban in both political and militaristic\r\nterms, if Iran continues to act as a “lone wolf” in the post-ISAF scenario regarding the\r\ncivil war in Afghanistan, and if the Arab oil monarchies maintain their polarizing support\r\nto religious dogmatism in the area, Afghanistan will not be able to achieve sustainable and\r\ncredible stability. Nonetheless, the paper concludes that in post-ISAF Afghanistan, stability\r\nwill depend more on the shifts within the political scenario than the security one, in the sense\r\nthat without a credible political transition, and without a non-contested electoral process in\r\n2014, all the previous costly and bloody efforts will have been in vain. In order to secure a\r\nsuccessful political transition, two factors will be decisive: i) a strong focus on traditional\r\ndomestic patterns of policy, rather than formal democracy procedures, ii) the involvement of\r\nregional actors, especially Pakistan, in order to reach a suitable, long-term political com\r\n-\r\npromise with the insurgents.