“Ethics With Ontology” both alludes to and contrasts with Hilary Putnam’s book Ethics Without Ontology (2004). In this book, Putnam proposes that there can be moral objectivity without objects, or moral truth without any descrip- tion of a moral realm. Since then, many others (for instance, T. Scanlon, R. Dworkin, C. Korsgaard, and D. Parfit have claimed that the view that there are moral truths has no ontological implications. They opt instead for a metaethical cognitivism without moral realism. On the other hand, one of the most striking developments in the metaethical debate of the past 15 years has been the renewal of nonnaturalist moral realism—the view which (at least in its so-called “robust” versions) presents the strongest ontological and metaphysical commitments, namely commitments to the existence of non-natural properties and facts.
- metaethics, moral supervenience
- moral nonnaturalism, moral ontology, moral supervenience