Information accuracy and collusion

Stefano Colombo, Aldo Pignataro

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

Abstract

In this study, we investigate firms' ability to collude when price discrimination based on the inherited market is possible, but the information accuracy about the inherited market is imperfect. We show that the level of information accuracy affects collusion sustainability nonmonotonically, according to the starting level of information and the consumers' reservation price. Moreover, we show that banning price discrimination might increase the sustainability of tacit collusion.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)638-656
Numero di pagine19
RivistaJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2022

Keywords

  • information accuracy

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