Inborn and experience-dependent models of categorical brain organization. A position paper

Guido Gainotti

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

11 Citazioni (Scopus)


The present review aims to summarize the debate in contemporary neuroscience between inborn and experience-dependent models of conceptual representations that goes back to the description of category-specific semantic disorders for biological and artifact categories. Experience-dependent models suggest that categorical disorders are the by-product of the differential weighting of different sources of knowledge in the representation of biological and artifact categories. These models maintain that semantic disorders are not really category-specific, because they do not respect the boundaries between different categories. They also argue that the brain structures which are disrupted in a given type of category-specific semantic disorder should correspond to the areas of convergence of the sensory-motor information which play a major role in the construction of that category. Furthermore, they provide a simple interpretation of gender-related categorical effects and are supported by studies assessing the importance of prior experience in the cortical representation of objects On the other hand, inborn models maintain that category-specific semantic disorders reflect the disruption of innate brain networks, which are shaped by natural selection to allow rapid identification of objects that are very relevant for survival. From the empirical point of view, these models are mainly supported by observations of blind subjects, which suggest that visual experience is not necessary for the emergence of category-specificity in the ventral stream of visual processing. The weight of the data supporting experience-dependent and inborn models is thoroughly discussed, stressing the fact observations made in blind subjects are still the subject of intense debate. It is concluded that at the present state of knowledge it is not possible to choose between experience-dependent and inborn models of conceptual representations.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)1-19
Numero di pagine19
RivistaFrontiers in Human Neuroscience
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2015


  • Ategory-specific semantic disorders
  • Domains of knowledge hypothesis
  • Inborn models of conceptual representations
  • Role of experience in the representation of objects
  • Sensory-motor model of semantic knowledge


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