TY - JOUR
T1 - In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting
AU - Bordignon, Massimo
AU - Cerniglia, Floriana Margherita
AU - Revelli, Federico
PY - 2003
Y1 - 2003
N2 - This paper uses Italian local government data to test for fiscal interaction arising from yardstick competition. To discriminate yardstick competition from competing theories of strategic interaction, we account for the incentives and constraints generated by the electoral system, in particular for the presence of term limits and the size of the majorities supporting the mayors. Estimation of a local property tax setting equation uncovers positive spatial auto-correlation in local tax rates of jurisdictions where the mayors run for re-election in uncertain contests, while interaction is absent where either mayors face a term limit or are backed by large majorities.
AB - This paper uses Italian local government data to test for fiscal interaction arising from yardstick competition. To discriminate yardstick competition from competing theories of strategic interaction, we account for the incentives and constraints generated by the electoral system, in particular for the presence of term limits and the size of the majorities supporting the mayors. Estimation of a local property tax setting equation uncovers positive spatial auto-correlation in local tax rates of jurisdictions where the mayors run for re-election in uncertain contests, while interaction is absent where either mayors face a term limit or are backed by large majorities.
KW - proterty tax rates
KW - spatial econometrics
KW - yardstick competition
KW - proterty tax rates
KW - spatial econometrics
KW - yardstick competition
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10807/6748
U2 - 10.1016/S0094-1190(03)00062-7
DO - 10.1016/S0094-1190(03)00062-7
M3 - Article
SN - 0094-1190
SP - 199
EP - 217
JO - Journal of Urban Economics
JF - Journal of Urban Economics
ER -