The aim of this paper is to examine the role that Kant assigned to the imagination, in the transcendental deduction of the categories. As it is known, this role is highly controversial: some scholars are convinced that the imagination has a function which is merely ancillary and subordinated to the intellect (and to the sensibility); while others retain that its role is relevant, even though the intellect alone is entitled to a place of honor in the first Critique. My point is that it is possible to argue that imagination has a crucial role in the deduction of the pure concepts of the intellect, precisely because the conceptual architecture of The Critique of Pure Reason is threefold and not simply twofold.
|Titolo tradotto del contributo||[Autom. eng. transl.] The role of imagination in the transcendental deduction of categories|
|Numero di pagine||9|
|Rivista||RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEOSCOLASTICA|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Pubblicato - 2017|