I piani di stock option nelle aziende di famiglia quotate: l'approccio dei benefici privati remunerativi

The study proposes an original explanation, alternative to the “optimal contracting theory” and to the “rent extraction theory”, for the use of Stock Option Plans in Family Firms. It is based on a classification of private benefits of control which includes the “idiosyncratic private benefits”, remunerating some family-specific resources that the family key figures contribute to the firm (i.e. entrepreneurial talent, personal relationships, reputation, long-term orientation, etc.). These resources have positive effects on future results, but they are in the meanwhile not contractible and their value cannot be assessed to shareholders’ capital. The study posits the use of stock option plans (SOPs) as a device to allow entrepreneurial families key figures to extract this value potential, if and when it should transfer into actual results. SOPs with long-term horizon, performance orientation and family beneficiaries are unsatisfactorily explained by “optimal contracting” and “rent extraction” theories and are instead better explained by the “idiosyncratic private benefits approach”. An empirical analysis on 267 stock option plans issued to directors in Italian listed family firms, during the period 2007-2010, finds an exploratory empirical evidence, confirming the existence of 23 issues consistent with the “idiosyncratic private benefits” hypothesis. Furthermore, a logit regression confirms the likelihood of these SOPs increases with higher involvement of family key figures in the governance of the firm (family CEO, board familiness, family CEO duality, founder family CEO) consistently with the premises of the hypotheses.