How to get rid of the belief bias: Boosting analytical thinking via pragmatics

L Macchi, F Poli, L Caravona, Michela Vezzoli, M Franchella, M Bagassi

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

Abstract

The previous research attempts to reduce the influence of the belief bias on deductive thinking have often been unsuccessful and, when they succeeded, they failed to replicate. In this paper, we propose a new way to see an old problem. Instead of considering the analytical abilities of the respondent, we focus on the communicative characteristics of the experimental task. By changing the pragmatics into play through a subtle manipulation of the instruction of the syllogism problem, we obtained a strong improvement in the accuracy of the performance in both untrained and trained in logic respondents. We suggest that current models of deductive thinking should be broadened to consider also communicative understanding as part of the processing of the problem.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)595-613
Numero di pagine19
RivistaEurope's Journal of Psychology
Volume15
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2019

Keywords

  • analytical thinking
  • belief bias
  • categorical syllogism
  • dual-process theories
  • pragmatics

Fingerprint

Entra nei temi di ricerca di 'How to get rid of the belief bias: Boosting analytical thinking via pragmatics'. Insieme formano una fingerprint unica.

Cita questo