Abstract
According to some scholars, universalist semantics of the future are incompatible with classical ascriptions of probability. This alleged fact is used as an argument for the linearist semantics of the future. In this paper, we show that, on the contrary, universalist semantics of the future are in harmony with the theory of probability, while the advocates of linearist semantics have to pay high theoretical costs to maintain the coherence with the classical theory of probability.
| Lingua originale | English |
|---|---|
| pagine (da-a) | 1-13 |
| Numero di pagine | 13 |
| Rivista | Inquiry |
| Volume | 2022 |
| DOI | |
| Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2022 |
Keywords
- Degrees of credence
- Future tense semantics
- Open Future
- Probability
- Universalism vs. Linearism