Fiscal Rules and the selection of politicians: theory and evidence from Italy

Matteo Gamalerio; Federico Trombetta

Fiscal Rules and the selection of politicians: theory and evidence from Italy

Risultato della ricerca: Working paper › Documento di lavoro

Lingua originale	Inglese
Numero di pagine	66
Stato di pubblicazione	Pubblicato - 2021

Keywords

fiscal rules, selection of politicians, deficit, difference-in-discontinuity

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