Fiscal Rules and the Selection of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Italy

Matteo Gamalerio; Federico Trombetta

Fiscal Rules and the Selection of Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Italy

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivista › Articolo in rivista

Lingua originale	English
pagine (da-a)	N/A-N/A
Rivista	American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
Stato di pubblicazione	Pubblicato - 2024

Keywords

fiscal rules, selection of politicians, deficit, difference-in-discontinuity

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