Fiscal Federalism and Lobbying

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

33 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

Which government functions should be decentralized (resp. centralized) once lobbying behavior is taken into account? We find that the answer largely depends on how the interests of the regional lobbies are positioned with respect to the function to be decentralized (resp. centralized). When regional lobbies have conflicting interests, then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under centralization than under decentralization. On the contrary, when regional lobbies have aligned interests, then lobbying is less damaging for social welfare under decentralization, provided that policy spillovers; on the non-organized groups are not too strong. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)2288-2301
Numero di pagine14
RivistaJournal of Public Economics
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2008

Keywords

  • fiscal federalism

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