Firms' symmetry and sustainability of collusion in a Hotelling duopoly

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1 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

We use a differentiated duopoly a la Hotelling to assess the impact of firms symmetry on the sustainability of a tacit collusive agreement. We obtain that the smaller firm has the greater incentive to deviate and that symmetry helps collusion for any possible differentiation degree.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)338-346
Numero di pagine9
RivistaEconomics Bulletin
Volume29
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2009

Keywords

  • Horizontal differentiation
  • Symmetry
  • Tacit collusion

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