Abstract
In publicly traded companies, highly dilutive rights issues create market anomalies throughout
the whole offer period, especially with respect to rights’ prices, which quote considerably
below their fair value. These anomalies could cause severe losses to non-subscribing
shareholders, inducing them to take part in the operation even if the financial perspectives of
the company would have suggested otherwise (= enforced subscription mechanism). In order
to strike a proper balance between enabling companies to raise new capital while simultaneously
protecting investors, company law provides an array of regulatory strategies; the aim
of this paper is to analyze the function and the contents of managers’ liability to investors
(art. 2395 Italian Civil Code) as a constraint to managers’ discretionary power in setting the
economic and regulatory conditions of share issuances.
Titolo tradotto del contributo | [Autom. eng. transl.] Company financing and compulsion to subscribe. The hyper-diluting capital increases |
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Lingua originale | Italian |
pagine (da-a) | 547-586 |
Numero di pagine | 40 |
Rivista | Osservatorio del Diritto Civile e Commerciale |
DOI | |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2018 |
Pubblicato esternamente | Sì |
Keywords
- Enforced Subscription
- Managers’ Liability To Investors
- Rights Issue
- Share Issuance
- Shareholders’ Dilution