Fee versus royalty licensing in spatial Cournot competition

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

6 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

This article investigates the optimal licensing mechanism in a spatial model where competitors set quantities and one firm owns a cost-reducing innovation. We show that when the firms spatially discriminate, the innovator gets higher profits by licensing through royalties instead than through a fixed fee, whereas in the case of uniform delivered quantities the innovator prefers licensing by royalties (fixed fee) if and only if it has not (has) a sufficiently strong locational disadvantage with respect to the potential licensee.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)859-879
Numero di pagine21
RivistaTHE ANNALS OF REGIONAL SCIENCE
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2014

Keywords

  • spatial Cournot competition

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