Exploring different views of exchange rate regime choice

Fabrizio Carmignani, Emilio Colombo*, Patrizio Tirelli

*Autore corrispondente per questo lavoro

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review

33 Citazioni (Scopus)


The empirical distinction between de facto and de jure exchange rate regimes raises a number of interesting questions. Which factors may induce a de facto peg? Why do countries enforce a peg but do not announce it? Why do countries "break their promises"? We show that a stable socio-political environment and an efficient political decision-making process are a necessary prerequisite for choosing a peg and sticking to it, challenging the view that sees the exchange rate as a commitment device. Policymakers seem rather concerned with regime sustainability in the face of adverse economic and socio-political fundamentals. © 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)1177-1197
Numero di pagine21
RivistaJournal of International Money and Finance
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2008


  • Consistency
  • Credibility
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Exchange rate regimes
  • Finance
  • de facto classification


Entra nei temi di ricerca di 'Exploring different views of exchange rate regime choice'. Insieme formano una fingerprint unica.

Cita questo