Experimental Ethics. A Critical Analysis

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According to experimental philosophers, experiments conducted within the psychological sciences and the neurosciences can show that moral intuitions are incapable of thorough justification. Thus, as a substitute for reliable philosophical justifications, psychological or neuropsychological explanations should be taken into consideration to provide guidance about our conduct. - In my essay I shall argue against both claims. First, I will defend the justificatory capacity of moral philosophy and maintain that empirical evidence cannot undermine moral judgements. Secondly I will point to some methodological difficulties in psychological and neuroscientific explanations of moral judgements. Finally, I will show that Greene's (2008) argument from morally irrelevant factors fails to prove that moral implications can be drawn from scientific theories about moral psychology.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Titolo della pubblicazione ospiteMorality in Times of Naturalising the Mind
EditorC. Lumer
Numero di pagine18
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2014


  • Neuroethics
  • experimental ethics


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