Exit and Voice: Yardstick Versus Fiscal Competition Across Governments

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

Abstract

Government competition is often invoked as one of the main advantage of decentralization. But competition across governments can take two forms, through tax competition (exit) or yardstick competition (voice). We show these two forms may affect political equilibria in opposite directions. Tax competition increases the disciplining effect of elections on politicians, but it reduces the selection effect. Yardstick competition works in just the opposite direction. However, the two forms of competition may be complementary as expected welfare is concerned.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)117-137
Numero di pagine21
RivistaItalian Economic Journal
Volume1
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2015

Keywords

  • fiscal competition

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