Excess returns in Public-Private Partnerships: Do governments pay too much?

Marco Buso*, Michele Moretto, Dimitrios Zormpas

*Autore corrispondente per questo lavoro

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review


We study the optimal design of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) when there is unobservable action on the private party's side. We show that if the private party does not have negotiating power over the project's surplus, then no inefficient delays are attributable to the moral hazard issue. However, if the private party has negotiating power, then the first-best timing is not guaranteed. The time discrepancy is shown to be costly in terms of overall project efficiency. The explicit consideration of the private party's negotiating power can explain empirical evidence that private parties in PPPs tend to reap excess returns. These results are discussed in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and its implications for PPPs.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)N/A-N/A
RivistaEconomic Modelling
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2021


  • COVID-19
  • Investment timing
  • Moral hazard
  • Public projects
  • Public-private partnerships
  • Real options


Entra nei temi di ricerca di 'Excess returns in Public-Private Partnerships: Do governments pay too much?'. Insieme formano una fingerprint unica.

Cita questo