Excess Capacity, Sunk Costs and Collusion: A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Game

Michele Grillo, D. Cossutta

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review

6 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper models competition among firms which operate at excess capacity as a non-cooperative bargaining game. It is shown that, provided sunk costs are sufficiently high, collusion among firms will ensue. This result has been employed to provide a non traditional interpretation of both price and non-price competition in the European car market in recent years
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)251-270
Numero di pagine20
RivistaInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 1986

Keywords

  • collusion
  • sunk costs

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