Excess Capacity, Sunk Costs and Collusion: A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Game

Michele Grillo; D. Cossutta

Excess Capacity, Sunk Costs and Collusion: A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Game

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivista › Articolo in rivista › peer review

Abstract

The paper models competition among firms which operate at excess capacity as a non-cooperative bargaining game. It is shown that, provided sunk costs are sufficiently high, collusion among firms will ensue. This result has been employed to provide a non traditional interpretation of both price and non-price competition in the European car market in recent years

Lingua originale	English
pagine (da-a)	251-270
Numero di pagine	20
Rivista	International Journal of Industrial Organization
Stato di pubblicazione	Pubblicato - 1986

Keywords

collusion
sunk costs

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AB - The paper models competition among firms which operate at excess capacity as a non-cooperative bargaining game. It is shown that, provided sunk costs are sufficiently high, collusion among firms will ensue. This result has been employed to provide a non traditional interpretation of both price and non-price competition in the European car market in recent years

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JO - International Journal of Industrial Organization

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