Efficient information acquisition with heterogeneous agents

Gianluca Femminis, Giulio Piccirilli

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review


In a Gaussian-quadratic economy with dispersed information, we correct the inefficiency in information acquisition by making the tax rate on agents own actions contingent on actions themselves. This aligns individual and social evaluations of information quality. Our policy is robust to considering heterogeneous unobservable costs in information acquisition, since agents share a common evaluation of the benefit of information quality.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)1-4
Numero di pagine4
RivistaEconomics Letters
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2021


  • Heterogeneous agents
  • Information acquisition
  • Welfare


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