Designing Pro-Competitive Data Pools: Which EU Competition Remedies for Data Silos?

Giulia Schneider*

*Autore corrispondente per questo lavoro

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

Abstract

The study moves from the assumption that the sharing of data can – under specific circumstances – give rise to anticompetitive aggregations of research-valuable data in the form of closed data silos. It addresses the question whether and how competition remedies available under EU law can be used for the design of pro-competitive data pools in digital markets. Interesting suggestions for these purposes are given by the recent enforcement policies enacted by the European Commission in high technology innovation markets. Although aimed at restoring very different anticompetitive conducts, these remedies nonetheless appear to share the common function of opening up established innovation alliances for the transfer of research-valuable information assets to external competing parties. Against this backdrop, the suitability of such information-based remedies in the context of digital markets is questioned. The study ultimately puts forward the opportunity of a close collaboration between competition and data protection authorities for a joint governance of data sharing remedies
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)161-186
Numero di pagine26
RivistaYearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2020

Keywords

  • data abuses

Fingerprint

Entra nei temi di ricerca di 'Designing Pro-Competitive Data Pools: Which EU Competition Remedies for Data Silos?'. Insieme formano una fingerprint unica.

Cita questo