Democracy, competition, and the principle of Isonomia: An economic analysis of the political exchange as an incomplete contract

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in libroChapter

Abstract

Extending some results of the economic theory of incomplete contracts to the analysis of political exchange, the contribution argues that the constitutional principle of isonomia - that is, the separation of legislature and government, which leads to democratically elected governments being subject to 'equal laws' - is a necessary condition for the optimal working of representative democracy.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Titolo della pubblicazione ospiteUnderstanding Democracy
EditorALBERT BRETON, GIANLUIGI GALEOTTI, PIERRE SALMON, RONALD wINTROBE
Pagine47-63
Numero di pagine17
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 1997

Keywords

  • democracy
  • incomplete contracts

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