Abstract
I study the relationship between debt maturity and agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in
unlisted firms. Exploiting cross-province variance in the development of local credit markets, I find that the monitoring effect of short-term bank debt is more effective in firms with less concentrated ownership structures.
| Lingua originale | English |
|---|---|
| pagine (da-a) | 2610-2616 |
| Numero di pagine | 7 |
| Rivista | Economics Bulletin |
| Volume | 35 |
| Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2015 |
| Pubblicato esternamente | Sì |
Keywords
- Agency conflicts
- Agency cost
- Bank debt
- Corporate control
- Corporate governance
- Credit market
- Debt maturity
- Entrepreneurial firm
- Firm efficiency
- Firm performance
- High-technology
- Individual shareholder
- Monitoring
- Owner-manager
- Ownership concentration
- Ownership structure
- Shareholders
- Short-term effect
- Unlisted firm