Cournot Competition in a Multiproduct Duopoly: Specialization through Licensing

Luigi Filippini

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review

Abstract

In a duopoly where both firms produce substitutes, we show that under process innovation, specialization is the equilibrium attained with cross-licensing. Each firm produces only the good for which it has an advantage, and social welfare may improve. Patent pool extension confirms the results.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)201-210
Numero di pagine10
RivistaINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS
Volume5
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2007

Keywords

  • cournot
  • cross licencing

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