present a general equilibrium model in which destination based consumption taxes finance public goods, while regulation of entry determines the number of firms in the markets. We find (i) no strategic interaction in commodity taxes; (ii) regulation leads to lower commodity tax rates if demand for public goods is more sensitive to income than demand for private goods and (iii) regulation policy is a strategically complement instrument if consumers do not over value product diversity. In the empirical part of the paper, we test our predictions using panel data for 21 OECD countries over the period 1990- 2008.
|Editore||Louvain-la-Neuve: Université catholique de Louvain Centre for Operations Research & Econometrics.|
|Numero di pagine||48|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Pubblicato - 2012|
- regulation, commodity tax, strategic interactions, fiscal federalism.