Assertions and future tense semantics

Non-bivalent semantics of the future tense assert that propositions regarding future\r\ncontingents are neither true nor false. One of the most relevant non-bivalent semantics\r\nis supervaluationism (Thomason in Theoria 36(3):264–281, 1970; Thomason, in:\r\nGabbay, Guenthner (eds) Handbook of philosophical logic, Springer, Berlin, 1984),\r\nwhich preserves important logical principles. Recently, non-bivalent semantics are\r\nunder attack from some pragmatics arguments: these semanticswould be incompatible\r\nwith our practices of asserting future contingents and with the probability we ascribe\r\nto such assertions (Besson and Hattiangadi in Philosophical Studies 167(2):251–271,\r\n2014; Cariani and Santorio in Mind 127(505):129–165, 2018). The aim of this paper is\r\nto defend supervaluationism against this kind of criticism.We argue that, if probability\r\nis interpreted as the subjective belief in a proposition and if a semantic contextualism\r\nis adopted, supervaluationism makes correct predictions concerning the norms that\r\ngovern our practices of asserting future contingents. Obviously, other arguments can\r\nbe proposed against supervaluationism, but they must be of a different kind, such as\r\nmetaphysical arguments.