Antitrust Appraisal of Mergers in Oligopolistic Markets

Michele Grillo, Lara Magnani

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in libroChapter

Abstract

In this paper we ask whether and how there can be room for the notion of dominance to be sensibly applied to mergers in non-collusive oligopolies. We come to the somewhat unexpected conclusion that, even in oligopoly, the European test of 'dominance' is much closer to the US test of 'substantial lessening of competition' than is usually thought to be.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Titolo della pubblicazione ospiteAntitrust Between EC Law and National Law
EditorE.A. Raffaelli
Pagine291-301
Numero di pagine11
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2005

Keywords

  • Antitrust
  • Merger

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