An Ultimatum Game with Multidimensional Response Strategies

W Güth, Mv Levati, Chiara Nardi*, I Soraperra

*Autore corrispondente per questo lavoro

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

Abstract

We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative approach to type classification, we find that the majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome-based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer's demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer. According to our data, this result can be explained by a concern for moral integrity rather than by a strong preference for equality.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)281-310
Numero di pagine30
RivistaReview of Behavioral Economics
Volume3
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2016

Keywords

  • Ultimatum
  • Experiments
  • Incomplete information
  • Social preferences

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