Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

Antonio Acconcia, Salvatore Piccolo, Giovanni Immordino, Patrick Rey

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

9 Citazioni (Scopus)


We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistent with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)1-44
Numero di pagine44
RivistaScandinavian Journal of Economics
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2014
Pubblicato esternamente


  • Deterrence
  • Mafia
  • leniency
  • whistle-blower


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