A Truthmaker Semantics for Reason-Based Conditionals

This paper aims at developing a system of deontic logic based on the idea that obligations—both conditional and unconditional—are grounded on possibly incompatible conditional reasons, which themselves stem from norms, here understood as practical principles in general. The core intuition is that a norm justifies the necessity of performing a particular action or producing a particular state of affairs, provided that a specific condition is realized. Consequently, practical reasons are identified with facts that trigger norms. This gives rise to two general issues: from a philosophical perspective, determining which basic principles about reasons should be assumed to derive consistent oughts without leading to counterintuitive consequences; from a logical perspective, constructing a conflict tolerant system of deontic logic that incorporates these principles within a framework based on a semantics that represents reasons as facts. The primary contribution of this paper is the development of a novel hyperintensional truthmaker semantics, designed to address these two issues.