A Too Thin True Future: The Problem of Grounding Within Presentist TRL Semantics

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In this paper, we discuss the coherence and the stability of three rather plausible philosophical intuitions: the idea that all that exists is present (Presentism); the idea that there exists a true future, although it is just a contingent future (Thin Red Line); and the idea that a proposition depends on (or is grounded in) a truthmaker (Truthmaking). We will not show that assuming these three ideas together is logically incoherent; however, their combination seems to be very difficult to hold and, ultimately, it should be discarded. As a consequence, some of these assumptions must be rejected. We will analyze in detail one of the most promising strategies that can be pursed to reconcile Truthmaking and Presentism: adopting a liberalized version of Truthmaking, for which not only what exists but also what will exist and what existed can ground the truth of a proposition. However, as for the future, this strategy works only if the future is historically closed. If there are future contingents, this line of defense is flawed.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Titolo della pubblicazione ospiteOckhamism and Philosophy of Time
EditorA Santelli
Numero di pagine23
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2022

Serie di pubblicazioni



  • Presentism
  • TRL semantics


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