A Microeconomic Model of the Demand for Civil Justice: Is One Institutional Context Better Than Another?

Veronica Grembi, Maria Alessandra Antonelli

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review

2 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper analyzes how institutional elements affect the decision to file of risk neutral agents. In particular, we introduce an objective probability of winning given by the combination of a precedent-weight parameter (defining the type of legal system) and a transparency factor. 603,000 simulated trials, shaped upon our model, reveal two main findings: 1) the transparency level matters in terms of inefficient decisions; 2) a precedent driven system is not necessarily more efficient. Hence, policy makers should invest in increasing the level of information among courts and between courts and the parties both in civil and common law systems.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)1-24
Numero di pagine24
RivistaEuropean Journal of Law and Economics
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2012

Keywords

  • Comparative Efficiency of Legal Systems
  • Legal Precedent

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