Abstract
A significant philosophical justification for the development
of paraconsistent logics is the observation that there are theories (and,
more generally, datasets) which are informative in their respective domains
and yet allow for the derivation of contradictions, either on their
own or when combined with other theories. A system of logic can represent deductive
reasoning within such theories while avoiding triviality, i.e. it can be
designed in such a way that the presence of a contradiction is not sufficient
for deriving everything whatsoever. The underlying idea is that
inconsistent theories typically contain consistent sub-theories which are
legitimate for studying their own domains and should not be affected by
contradictions involving propositions that are out of their scope. The
framework employed here is a proposal to formally capture this intuition
in a precise way, thanks to the possibility of comparing the scope
of theories both in the syntax and in the semantics.
Lingua originale | English |
---|---|
Titolo della pubblicazione ospite | Proceedings of the Sixth World Congress of Paraconsistency |
Pagine | 94-98 |
Numero di pagine | 5 |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2022 |
Evento | Sixth World Congress of Paraconsistency - Torun Durata: 5 set 2022 → 8 set 2022 |
Convegno
Convegno | Sixth World Congress of Paraconsistency |
---|---|
Città | Torun |
Periodo | 5/9/22 → 8/9/22 |
Keywords
- paraconsistency
- possible world semantics
- topic inconsistency