4. Dangerous liaisons across levels of government in an emergency

In this paper, we develop a theoretical model to evaluate the re-centralization of \r\npublic procurement in an emergency under diferent collective choice mechanisms. \r\nWe show that the equilibrium degree of centralization is the result of the interplay \r\nof three forces: (i) an “efciency gain” efect, that works in favour of full centralization, since central government is likely to be more efcient than regional governments in purchasing goods on the market, and (ii) “dangerous liaisons” across levels \r\nof government, that work against centralization, because of (ii.a) the central government’s willingness to scapegoat failures on regional governments (“blame efect”), \r\nand (ii.b) the regional governments’ shame in delegating to the centre (“shame \r\nefect”). We have used the model to interpret the change in the governance of public \r\nprocurement in Italy during the COVID-19 crisis. In fact, Italy, likewise many other \r\ncountries around the world, responded to COVID-19 emergency with a mixed bag \r\nof centralized and decentralized measures that most likely refected the particular \r\nways in which politicians assumed blame and shame would work at diferent stages \r\nof the pandemic rather than their considerations on efficiency