Abstract
Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we
show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where
the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than
the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is socially
efficient.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 269-282 |
| Number of pages | 14 |
| Journal | Bulletin of Economic Research |
| Volume | 59 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2007 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 9 Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure
Keywords
- differentiation
- industrial organization
- innovation
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