When the two ends meet: an experiment on cooperation and social capital

We study the behaviour of individuals with different geographic\r\norigins interacting in a same public good game. We exploit the peculiar composition of the experimental sample to compare the performance of groups where individuals have mixed origins to homogeneous\r\ngroups. We find that, despite the absence of any geographic framing, mixed groups exhibit significantly lower contributions. We also\r\nfind that cooperation levels differ significantly across geographic\r\norigins, in line with the existing literature. This is explained by a different impact of coordination opportunities, such as communication,\r\nas we show by manipulating them. Our results point towards integration as a crucial aspect for the economic development of intercultural\r\nsocieties. They also confirm that, rather than being explained just by\r\nthe differences in institutions and economic opportunities, the Italian\r\nNorth-South divide embeds elements of distrust, prejudice and a\r\nconsequent path dependence in the level of social capital.