[Autom. eng. transl.] The measures adopted by the European Union from 2010 to deal with the economic and financial crisis have redesigned the relationship between government levels in terms of public finance, surpassing the architecture that characterized European integration since the Treaty of Rome . It was not, in fact, treated of a "transfer of competences", in the sense of allocating the exercise of state sovereignty to a supranational level, but rather of a new juridical order that rests on the primacy of the accounting parameters elaborated in Europe with respect to the choices economic and financial policies of the States and on the ex ante surveillance of budget policies based on the parameters themselves. All this, moreover, has not failed to affect the identity of the state spheres, transforming national constitutional systems and ending up also involving substantial principles and rights. The contribution from the reconstruction of the European interventions in the matter of budget constraints and from the incorporation of the Fiscal Compact at the constitutional level, analyzes the repercussions on the stability of the social State and on the principle of subsidiarity, with the aim of verifying if there is still space for national political choices that can lead to considering the social dimension of the economy in the European Union, to assess that economic matter is not a field of action in itself concluded and autonomous, but is closely linked to social matters and rights.
|Translated title of the contribution||[Autom. eng. transl.] WELFARE STATE BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND BUDGETARY RESTRICTIONS: IMPACT ON THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE|
|Number of pages||35|
|Publication status||Published - 2014|
- ART. 81 COST
- FISCAL COMPACT
- WELFARE STATE