Versailles e oltre. Italia e Gran Bretagna dalla Conferenza di pace alle sfide del dopoguerra

[Autom. eng. transl.] The end of the First World War and the developments of the Peace Conference bring to light the tensions which, in the course of the conflict, had accumulated between the Allies. In the case of Italy, this translates into a progressive isolation, which significantly contributes to determining the disappointing outcome of the Parisian negotiations, in particular as regards the Adriatic settlement. The British attitude contributes significantly to this result and, in particular, that of the cabinet Lloyd George, who came to power on 6 December 1916. The strong personality of the Prime Minister, together with the attitude of the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour (openly critical of the London pact), play, in fact, an important part in distancing the British political leaders from the Italian ones already during the conflict. The entry into the war of the United States and the search by London for an axis with the Atlantic Power accentuate this trend. In Paris, the different priorities of Rome and London are added to this complex of factors, both in the European and in the former Habsburg scene. In both areas, Italy's sectoral interests clash, in particular, with the broader British perspective, aimed at reconciling the needs of the Empire (and of the dominions, which not by chance will sign the Treaty of Versailles as separate subjects from London and as separate subjects from London will become part of the League of Nations) with those of European stability. The 'double containment' of the German threat and that potentially represented by Soviet Russia, the limitation of French ambitions (perceived as destabilizing by some members of the Cabinet) and the future Central European order, the claims of whose 'nationalities' constituted a strongly felt problem from public opinion, these are just some of the issues on which the attention of the British delegates is drawn. Against this background, the disconnect with respect to the Italian positions is understandable; a disconnect that manifests itself on various issues related to the future assets of the Adriatic: from that on the distribution of the remains of the former Austro-Hungarian fleet to that on the future of Rijeka, destined to assume a central role in national political life between 1919 and 1921. From the British point of view, however, these questions remained marginal. The arrival of Lord Curzon at the Foreign Office in place of Balfour (23 October 1919) accentuates this trend, helping to shift London's attention towards Central-Eastern Europe, where the outbreak of the Russo-Polish war and the the proliferation of the 'red republics' posed the pressing problem of a possible expansion of the Soviet threat. Another reason for the cooling of a relationship in which, at the beginning of the conflict, both London and Rome, albeit for different reasons, had placed many hopes.