The Welfare Costs of Bank Regulation by Deposit Rate Ceilings

Carsten Krabbe Nielsen; Gerd Hellmut Weinrich

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.012

The Welfare Costs of Bank Regulation by Deposit Rate Ceilings

Carsten Krabbe Nielsen, Gerd Hellmut Weinrich^*

^*Corresponding author

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In a transparent and parsimonious moral hazard setting, various types of inefficiencies of deposit rate ceilings are identified. Welfare with ceilings may be lower than welfare without these and a more risky environment may render deposit rate ceilings impotent.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	33-37
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.012
Publication status	Published - 2019

Keywords

Bank regulation
Deposit rate ceilings
Moral hazard
Welfare

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10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.012

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title = "The Welfare Costs of Bank Regulation by Deposit Rate Ceilings",

abstract = "In a transparent and parsimonious moral hazard setting, various types of inefficiencies of deposit rate ceilings are identified. Welfare with ceilings may be lower than welfare without these and a more risky environment may render deposit rate ceilings impotent.",

keywords = "Bank regulation, Deposit rate ceilings, Moral hazard, Welfare, Bank regulation, Deposit rate ceilings, Moral hazard, Welfare",

author = "Nielsen, {Carsten Krabbe} and Weinrich, {Gerd Hellmut}",

year = "2019",

doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.012",

language = "English",

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pages = "33--37",

journal = "Economics Letters",

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AU - Nielsen, Carsten Krabbe

AU - Weinrich, Gerd Hellmut

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AB - In a transparent and parsimonious moral hazard setting, various types of inefficiencies of deposit rate ceilings are identified. Welfare with ceilings may be lower than welfare without these and a more risky environment may render deposit rate ceilings impotent.

KW - Bank regulation

KW - Deposit rate ceilings

KW - Moral hazard

KW - Welfare

KW - Bank regulation

KW - Deposit rate ceilings

KW - Moral hazard

KW - Welfare

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10807/131918

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.012

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.012

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

VL - 2019

SP - 33

EP - 37

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

The Welfare Costs of Bank Regulation by Deposit Rate Ceilings

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Keywords

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