The Value of Voting Rights in Italian Cooperative Banks: A Quasi-Natural Experiment

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

It is widely believed in the corporate governance literature that deviating from the `one share-one vote' principle leads to corporate inefficiencies. We analyze the market reaction to a change from the `one head-one vote' to the `one share-one vote' mechanism by means of a quasi-natural experiment: an Italian reform forcing a subset of cooperative banks to transform into joint-stock companies. We estimate the market valuation of the effects of the governance change around the event date being equal to a cumulative average return of about 14% using an event study methodology, and of about 13% using bayesian techniques.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)861-882
Number of pages22
JournalManagerial Finance
Volume46
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Keywords

  • Bank Regulation
  • Corporate Governance
  • Corporate Voting
  • Voting Premium

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The Value of Voting Rights in Italian Cooperative Banks: A Quasi-Natural Experiment'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this