The Price of Silence: Media Competition, Capture, and Electoral Accountability

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Is competition in the mass media market an effective deterrent against media capture? Does it prevent political groups from influencing reporting? This paper shows that in some cases it does not. Building on the literature on media capture, the model highlights that, under fairly generic assumptions, high competition in the media market can drive the cost of media capture to zero, making capture easier. Moreover, it highlights conditions on the parameters where the effect of competition on capture is non-monotonic, i.e. capture may occur for levels of competition lower, but also higher, than those leading to media freedom.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)N/A-N/A
JournalEuropean Journal of Political Economy
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Keywords

  • Mass Media Competition
  • Media Capture
  • Political Agency

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