Abstract
We show that paradoxical conclusions similar to those emerging
from reasonings of backward induction can arise also in simultaneous
move games with incomplete information.
In a static setting, these paradoxes are particularly puzzling, because
the usual attempts to avoid the backward induction solution do not
work.
In a dynamic setting, there is a way out of the paradoxes, which hinges
on a (possibly endogenous) uncertainty over the past behaviour of the
players and does not call for a long time-horizon.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 195-202 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Bulletin of Economic Research |
| Volume | 55 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2003 |
Keywords
- backward induction
- belief revision
- common knowledge
- game theory
- paradox
- rational choice
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