Simul stabunt, simul cadent? I rapporti indo-pakistani e l’ombra del “nuovo Afghanistan”

[Autom. eng. transl.] The more or less structural tension with Pakistan is a central feature of Indian geopolitics. This tension, which dates back to the time of the 'Partition' of the British domains in the subcontinent, was expressed in various forms, direct (eg, the wars of 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999) and indirect (eg, the war by proxy underway in Jammu & Kashmir from the time of its accession to the Indian Union, widely supported and financed by Islamabad). After the tremors of acute crisis of the nineties - jolts culminating in the so-called 'war of Kargil' - this tension must always be under-traced. The centrality assumed by the region in the immediate post-September 11th and the long western presence in Afghanistan have contributed to favoring this process. However, they have not affected the root causes of a rivalry that is likely to resurface in the coming months, in parallel with the disengagement of the ISAF forces. After the fall of the Taliban government, India has actively moved to Kabul, taking advantage of the (partial) downsizing to which the presence of its historic rival has gone. By contrast, Pakistan has never renounced to read the role of Afghanistan in the light of the traditional doctrine of 'strategic depth' and to consider it - on the basis of existing ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity - part of its 'national background'. The expected events for 2014 (first of all, in addition to the downsizing of the interactional presence, the presidential elections destined to put an end to the more than ten-year 'reign' of Hamid Karzai) will be translated, in all probability, into a new food for these dynamics at least to the extent that they will lead to a reactivation of the country's 'traditional' power logics and a consolidation of the links between the members of the national establishment and their cross-border referents. The story of negotiations with the Taliban factions and their 'reintegration' into the political circuit is a good example on the one hand, of the fragmentation of the Afghan institutional framework and of the conflicting currents that cross it under the other, on the other of the influence possessed by the actors that, although unable to impose solutions of their liking, they appear to be endowed with ample veto power. In this perspective, the shadow of the 'new Afghanistan' appears destined to return to hover over the system of Indo-Pakistani relations, with all the repercussions it may have on the delicate situation in Kahsmir. Taking advantage of the legitimacy problems that afflict (albeit for different reasons) the government of Islamabad like that of New Delhi, it also risks assuming a particular salience, returning to propose itself as one of the keys to regional stability.