Senso o sensi dell’esistere? I livelli ontologici del reale nel cosiddetto “tomismo analitico”

This article aims to present and discuss the position of some contemporary philosophers, classifiable within the so called “analytical Thomism”. According to them existence has not only the sense of a second order predicate, that is to say a predicate of concepts - as maintained up to a few years ago by the majority of analytic philosophers followers of Russel’s and Quine’s “one sense theory” of existence - but also the sense of a first order predicate, namely a predicate of individuals. The reasons they bring in favour of such so-called “two sense theory” of existence stem from the semantic of natural languages, and from some suggestions by both Thomas Aquinas and Frege, whereas the criticisms against the “one sense theory” seek to demonstrate a vicious circle within the concept of “instantiation” typical of Russell/Quine’s position. The article concludes pointing out some still open problems of the “two sense theory”, which should be dealt with in order to make it not only interesting and plausible, as it is, but also coherent. An Appendix of the article clarifies and discusses the meta-philosophical category of “analytical Thomism”.