Abstract
Under the assumption of decreasing returns to scale, we compare several licensing mechanisms - per-unit royalty, an ad valorem royalty, and a revenue-royalty, and combinations with fixed fees - for an insider patentee. In the case of a non-drastic innovation, the patentee maximizes its profits by offering, respectively, an ad valorem royalty, a revenue-royalty and a two-part per-unit royalty, if the cost function is scarcely or highly convex, moderately-low convex, and moderately-high convex. In the case of a drastic innovation, the patentee always offers an ad valorem royalty contract.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 47-76 |
| Journal | JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS |
| Volume | 118 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2016 |
Keywords
- royalties
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