Responsabilità da reato dell’ente e prospettive evolutive. Verso un modello «autonomistico» e non «personalisticamente mediato» di ascrizione

[Autom. eng. transl.] This paper investigates the need to reconsider the classification scheme contained in Legislative Decree 231/2001 - placed halfway between the model of responsibility for imputation and that of the originäre Verbandshaftung - through the transition towards an autonomist paradigm, legally released. by the fact of the natural person, by virtue of which the entity is liable not for the predicate offense but for an offense coinciding with the non-observance of the duty to self-organize: this approach would be in line with the reflections developed within to the German-language literature of the nineties and that in the works of Günter Heine and Ernst-Johachim Lampe he would meet certain dogmatic references. The analysis - which also takes advantage of the comparative comparison with the English system of the Bribery Act and the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act - is conducted on a triple level: (i) systematic or of the misalignment, in the current ascriptive framework, between the structure of the indictment and the object of the reprimand; (ii) dynamic or of the assessment; (iii) constitutional or adherence to principles. The construct would also undermine that Jakobsian vision inspired by the so-called phase functional of the first Roxin - mainly expressed in the volume Kriminalpolitik und Strafrechtssystem and, firstly, in the 1966 essay Sinn und Grenzen staatlicher Strafe - which risks insinuating itself into the "system-231" and which - capturing especially in the formulation of article 8 - it substitutes "a Schuldbegriff [...] more oriented to social and juridical categories for guilt […] in the classical sense, understood as personal ethical deficiency […].