Regolamenti amministrativi e processo

[From the Conclusions] As an authoritative scholar has pointed out, there is an intrinsic difference between administrating conflicts of interests in particular situations, and framing general regulations of virtually infinite series of conflicts in situations described only in abstract terms. The difference may be irrelevant to define the concept of ‘normative act’, as a general category, and also to establish which kind of content parliamentary law can have, under Republican constitutional law (a law enacted by parliament can also have particular, not general, contents). But the difference still exists, and should not be overlooked, not even when positive discipline of a certain act relies on its formal characters, and not on its content. This is also true with regard to procedural law for the review of such acts: the mechanisms of judgment cannot be indifferent to the object of judgment and its nature. It is not illogic that a single legal framework encompasses the review of all administrative acts: both of general regulations, and particular acts. But it is necessary to inspect every point of this framework, because a review system basically designed to deal with particular acts can have dysfunctions – can lead to irrational consequences – when it is applied for judging general and abstract regulations. Positive law could deal with some of these problems; but if they are left unsolved, interpreters should intervene, with any available tool.