Abstract
Hitherto metaphysics has usually relied upon the same concept of reality that prevails within common sense and natural science, i.e. being a possible object of sensible experience: but according to the rules of logic such a concept is incompatible with the assertion and even the assumption of a supersensible reality. However, we have no reason to consent to it because it derives from an undue absolutization of the pragmatic criterion according to which my actual body is given a pre-eminence over my dreamed or imagined bodies and my real world is given a pre-eminence over all those Leibnizian possible worlds that some analytical philosophers rightly consider to be as real as our real world. In fact, a correct ontology must admit the ultimate identity of possibility and reality; as for the existence of God, it is to be proved a priori, on the model of St. Anselm’s argument, not a posteriori.
Translated title of the contribution | [Autom. eng. transl.] Reality, existence, possible worlds |
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Original language | Italian |
Pages (from-to) | 259-266 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | Acta Philosophica |
Volume | XXXIII |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2024 |
Keywords
- A Priori Proof of the Existence of God
- Fictitious Entities
- Metaphysics
- Possible Worlds
- Transcendence